The asymmetry in Tobia's modal arguments by Durieux, Jude Arnout
Apologetics – Ontological arguments The asymmetry in Tobia's modal arguments
The asymmetry in Tobia's modal arguments
1  Introduction
In his article "Does Religious belief infect Philosophical Analysis"1, Kevin Patrick Tobia presents two modal
ontological arguments, which he claims to be of equal validity and strength:
The common basis:
1. (Assumption) That which is possibly necessary is necessary.
2. (Definition)  A being has maximal  greatness if  and only if,  necessarily,  it  exists and is  omniscient,
omnipotent, and perfectly good.
The positive sequel:
3. (Premise) It is possible that there is a being with maximal greatness.
4. Therefore, necessarily, there exists a being with maximal greatness.
5. Therefore, there exists a being with maximal greatness.
The negative sequel:
3. (Premise) It is possible that there is not a being with maximal greatness.
4. Therefore, necessarily, there does not exist a being with maximal greatness.
5. Therefore, there does not exist a being with maximal greatness.
Tobia had  people  of  different  religious  persuasion  (theist,  agnostic,  and  atheist)  evaluate  these
arguments,  and  found  an  asymmetry  in  their  responses,  in  general  theists  considering  the  positive
argument much stronger than the negative one, agnostics considering it slightly stronger, and atheists
considering  it  weaker.   This  lead  him  to  conclude  a  bias  from religious  persuasion  to  philosophical
analysis.
Below I argue that the arguments are genuinely asymmetric, and that the correlation found allows no
such conclusion at all.  Religious persuasions come in many forms, but for simplicity I shall consider only
one specific kind of theism and one specific kind of atheism.  My argument can be extended to several
other kinds, though.
I shall also call a being that is (locally) omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good, “excellent”.
2  Validity
The first question regards validity.  If one accepts the model, the arguments are both equally valid 2.  There
was some difference in answers regarding validity,  but my hunch is  that those come mostly  from a
misunderstanding  of  the  term,  despite  a  definition  having  been  given.   Whether  one  considers  the
premiss true or not has no effect on validity – but a non-logician might confuse validity and soundness.
Theologians presumably having less logical training, they would be more prone to commit this error, and
it would be interesting to see the correlation between study field and difference in validity estimates.  But
I shall leave this point, which also isn’t Tobia's main point.
3  Strength
The  second  question  regards  strength.   The  argument  has  three  inputs:  an  assumption  (step  1),  a
definition (step 2), and a premiss (step 3), and all three influence the strength of the argument.
3.1  The assumption
The assumption is not true in all modal logics, but it seems unlikely that the same person would use
different  logics  in  interpreting  the  two  arguments.   Therefore  I  shall  ignore  that  possible  source  of
difference,  and  follow  a  possible-worlds  interpretation  (as  did  Tobia  in  his  analysis)  with  a  locally
transitive, reflexive, and symmetric ("equivalent") accessibility relation, so that there is a set of worlds
including the actual world ("Wa") that are all possible for each other.  This makes the assumption true.
1 Tobia, Kevin P., Does Religious Belief Infect Philosophical Analysis?  Religion, Brain & Behavior, 2016
2 There may be an issue with mixing up various types, or levels, of modality.  I shall ignore that here, though.
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3.2  The premiss
Given our interpretation above, one step influencing the strength is the premiss.
Since the premisses make opposite claims, even if all else were equal, the two arguments might already
be  of  hugely  different  strength3.   However,  theists  are  suppose  to  believe  the positive  premiss  and
atheists  the  negative  one,  so  much  of  this  difference  would  disappear  under  factor  analysis.   The
remainder would come down to whether theists would consider a world without God possible, or atheists a
world with God.  If one thinks the world exists only because God exists, one is unlikely to consider a
godless world possible – but if one believes the world exists brutely, one might well believe that a God
creating a world could have  existed the same way.  If  that is correct,  one would expect the positive
argument to be slightly stronger than the negative.
Conversely, the notion of necessary excellence being difficult, the atheist has the easier job: all it takes
for him to prove his premiss is to show a possible world in which no excellent being exists – for a fortiori, if
no excellent being exists, no necessarily excellent being exists.  The theist, however, will need to find a
world with an excellent being, and then show this being is necessarily excellent.
These differences are absolute,  in  that they exist  equally  for  both sides,  and might lead to unequal
strength attribution between the positive and negative argument (as seen in the agnostic answers), but
not to differences between theists and atheists in answering.
So if all else were equal, we might have seen all groups answering the way the agnostics do, by giving an
unequal strength to the two arguments.  But all else definitely isn’t equal.
3.3  The definition
A strong point of the modal argument is that one is free to choose the accessibility relation, and thereby
the set of possible worlds, provided it contain both Wa and a world in which the premise is true.  By
choosing that set one defines 'necessarily' and 'maximal greatness': a being is maximally great (“God”) if
it exists with the requested properties in each world in that set.  And this is where the asymmetry enters:
different sets lead to different notions of God.
That means that another step influencing the strength is the definition.
Consider the empty world (“W0”).  My theist believes that logic, mathematics, and other abstracta depend
on God, so for her W0 is truly empty – void of abstracta too.  Especially it has no worlds reachable (not
even itself), so it is not in the set of possible worlds that contain W a.  It is true that God would not exist in
that world, but since it is not a possible world under any equivalent accessibility relation, that doesn't
affect the argument.  And for her, the very existence of abstracta undergirds the positive premise and
refutes the negative premise.
My atheist, on the other hand, believes that God, if existing, would be subject to logic, and abstracta
somehow or other just exist (or work without existing, as with nominalism), even in W0 – and so for him W0
is still a possible world, and one that clearly refutes the positive and proves the negative premise.
Obviously, for the theist the positive argument is much stronger than the negative, and for the atheist the
other way around.  The agnostic can go either way, but for her the main issue would be whether abstracta
can “just exist”, as the atheist claims.  Given that they don't have an obvious aseity, the way some
versions of God have, nor a will that could will its own existence, the way some other versions of God
have4, the a priori likelihood of God “just existing” seems higher than the a priori likelihood of abstracta
“just existing”, and this would be reflected in their response.  Being agnostic, she would find neither
argument convincingly strong, so the difference between the two strengths would be small - which again
is just what we see.
Now all  I  have seen  is  the results  published  in  the article  –  maybe the raw data  would  refute this
interpretation by showing that agnostics rate both arguments as very strong.  It actually is quite possible
that both arguments are sound, but that would not lead to agnosticism (though together with other
arguments not dealt with here it might, of course).  Let me explain by example.
Imagine a deaf couple trying to establish whether there is music in the living room – that is, whether
someone with good hearing would hear music if placed there.  The wife reasons as follows: “Let's define
pervasive music as music that, if it can be heard in any room in the house, it can be heard in all rooms.
Then, if there is pervasive music in any room in the house, it will be in the living room too, and there will
be music here.  And there is a pervasive sound in some room, because our eldest son is playing rock
music in his bedroom.  Ergo, there is pervasive music, ergo there is pervasive music in the living room.”
3 Consider a pair of premises “It is [not] possible that there are two sets of two marbles each, counting up to five”.
4 The point here is that abstracta are what they are, whereas God can be chosen in a way to maximise the likelihood
of aseity
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The husband rejects this reasoning, as follows: “The house extends to the garden shed at the far end of
the lawn, which is so isolated that no music reaches there.  So there is one room that has no music, ergo
there is no pervasive music in the living room.”
Of course both are right, because by using different definitions of the house they also have different
definitions of ‘pervasive music’.  There is music in the living room that pervades through the whole main
building, but not to the garden shed.
Likewise, both the positive and the negative conclusion can be right, in that there is an excellent being
that exists as such in all non-empty worlds, but not in the empty world.  However, someone believing that
would be unlikely to call oneself an agnostic.
3.4  Another definition
There is still  another factor  influencing the outcome of  the research:  the meaning of  strong,  a  word
explicitly left undefined by Tobia.
Let an utterly great being be a being that necessarily exists and is excellent in any non-empty world.
Clearly, an utterly great being necessarily exists in  Wa.
The  negative  conclusion  is  firmer than  the  positive  one:  that  there  is  no  God  in  W0 is  exceedingly
probable, even if one believes that the existence of any non-empty world would require an utterly great,
being.
The positive conclusion has more substance than the negative one, in that it affirms the existence of a
being that is not disproven by the negative conclusion – the negative conclusion only forbids a maximally,
not an utterly, great being.
For  a  theist  (who  considers  'God'  a  synthetic  notion),  the  exact  limit  (beyond  the  actual)  of  God's
necessity might be less relevant than His existence, whereas for an atheist (who works with the mere
analytic concept of 'God'), any internal contradiction in the definition would suffice for his goals.  Where
the theist might merely react with “Ah, so I misunderstood God's nature somewhat”, the atheist would
consider the concept disproven..
4  Conclusion
...
Whether this is the case could theoretically be tested with a more detailed argument, indicating exactly
what shape the set of possible worlds takes.
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